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Bhupinder Singh Anand1 
Classical theory proves that every primitive recursive function is strongly 
representable in PA; that PA and PRA can both be interpreted in ZF; and that if 
ZF is consistent, then PA+PRA is consistent. We show that PA+PRA is 
inconsistent; it follows that ZF, too, is inconsistent. 
1. Overview 
Classical theory proves that: 
a) formal Peano Arithmetic, PA, and formal primitive recursive arithmetic, PRA, 
can both be interpreted in Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, ZF. 
b) if ZF is consistent, then PA+PRA is consistent. 
c) every primitive recursive function is strongly representable in PA. 
It also seems reasonable to suspect that: 
d) every primitive recursive function cannot be defined in PA. 
In the appended Meta-theorem 1 and Meta-lemma 1 [cf. An02], we now argue that: 
e) PA+PRA is inconsistent. 
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In Meta-theorem 1, we consider Gödel’s primitive recursive relation ~xBPA(Sb(y 
19|Z(y))) (cf. [Go31a], p24, def. 8.1; we note, in particular, that the index serves 
as a reminder that the primitive recursive relation BPA is specific to, and defined 
with reference to, the axioms of the recursively enumerable formal system PA, 
which is, essentially, Gödel’s arithmetic P in [Go31a]), and argue that it is not the 
standard interpretation of any of its formal representations in PA.  
In other words we argue that, if we assume the primitive recursive relation 
~xBPA(Sb(y 19|Z(y))) to be an abbreviation of some formula of PA, then we arrive 
at an inconsistency in PA.  
Intuitively, this is unexceptionable, since, prima facie, the use of a representation 
theorem (cf. [Me64], Proposition 3.23, p131) in standard derivations (cf. [Me64], 
Proposition 3.31, p143) of Gödel’s Theorem VI (cf. [Go31a], p24) appears to be 
both critical and necessary. Meta-theorem 1 proves the necessity, confirming (d). 
We consequently note, in Meta-lemma 1, that we cannot introduce a finite number 
of arbitrary primitive recursive functions and relations, as function letters and 
predicate letters respectively, into a formal system of Peano Arithmetic, such as 
PA, without risking inconsistency. Ipso facto, PA+PRA is inconsistent. 
It follows that, if the appended arguments are valid, then: 
f) ZF is inconsistent. 
2. Appendix 
Meta-theorem 1: There is a primitive recursive relation that is not the standard 
interpretation of any of its formal representations in a formal Peano Arithmetic PA.  
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Proof: We consider Gödel’s primitive recursive relation ~xBPA(Sb(y 19|Z(y))). 
(a) We assume that every primitive recursive function or relation is the standard 
interpretation of at least one of its formal representations in PA. 
(b) There is, thus, some PA-formula [~xBPA(Sb(y 19|Z(y)))] whose standard 
interpretation is the primitive recursive relation ~xBPA(Sb(y 19|Z(y))). 
(c) Now, in every model M  (cf. [Me64], p192-3) of PA, we can also interpret: 
(i) the integer 0 as the interpretation of the symbol “0”; 
(ii) the successor operation as the interpretation of the successor function “'”; 
(iii) addition and multiplication as the interpretations of “+” and “.”; 
(iv) the interpretation of the predicate letter = as the identity relation. 
(d) Since the numerals of PA interpret as a sub-domain of every model M of PA, the 
natural numbers are, then, a sub-domain of every M.  
(e) Further, by the hypothesis (a), all of Gödel’s 45 primitive recursive functions and 
relations ([Go31a], p17-22) are also, then, mirrored in every model M of PA, and 
the PA-formula, [~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))], always interprets as the M-relation 
~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p))), where [p] is the numeral that represents the natural number 
p in PA, and p is the Gödel-number of the PA-formula [(Ax)~xBPA(Sb(y 
19|Z(y)))]. 
(f) Hence, in every model M of PA, the relation ~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) holds in M if, 
and only if, x is a M-number that is not the Gödel-number of a proof of 
[(Ax)~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] in PA. 
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(g) Further, since the Gödel-number of a proof of [(Ax)~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] in PA 
is necessarily a natural number, ~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) holds in every model M of 
PA if x is an M-number that is not a natural number.  
(h) Now, Gödel has shown (cf. [Go31a], Theorem VI) that ~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) 
holds over the domain of the natural numbers.  
(i) It follows that ~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) is satisfied by all x in every model M of PA.  
(j) Hence, the PA-formula [(Ax)~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] is true (cf. [Me64], p51) in 
every model M of PA, and, by Gödel’s Completeness Theorem ([Me64], 
Corollary 2.14, p68), [(Ax)~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] is PA-provable. 
However, since Gödel has shown that [(Ax)~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] is not PA-provable 
(cf. [Go31a], Theorem VI), we conclude that assumption (a) does not hold. This proves 
the theorem.¶ 
Meta-lemma 1: We cannot introduce a finite number of arbitrary recursive number-
theoretic functions and relations, as function letters and predicate letters respectively, into 
PA without risking inconsistency. 
Proof: Adding “BPA”, and a finite number of other functions and relations in terms of 
which it is defined (cf. [Go31a], p17-22, def. 1-45), as new function letters and predicate 
letters, respectively, to PA, along with associated defining axioms (cf. [Me64], §9, p82), 
would yield a formal system PA* in which, by the arguments of Meta-theorem 1, the 
PA*-formulas, [(Ax)~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))], and therefore [~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))]2, are 
true in every model of PA*, and hence PA*-provable. 
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(Note that the argument is not that the PA* formula, [(Ax)~xBPA*(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))], is 
PA*-provable.) 
Since all the added functions and relations are primitive recursive, they are strongly 
represented in PA ([Me64], Proposition 3.23, p134). Every proof sequence of PA* can, 
thus, be converted into a proof sequence of PA ([Me64], Proposition 2.29, pp82-83). 
Ergo, if Gödel’s primitive recursive relation, ~xBPA(Sb(p 19|Z(p))), is represented in PA 
by [G(x)], then both [G(x)], and hence [(Ax)G(x)], are PA-provable - contradicting 
Gödel’s Theorem VI (cf. [Go31a], p24). This proves the lemma.¶ 
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